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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

THEORETICAL SPLITS AND CONSISTENT RESULTS ON
ANONYMOUS POLITICAL SPEECH: MAJORS v. ABELL AND ACLU
OF NEVADA v. HELLER

I. INTRODUCTION
In August of 2005, the citizens of Missouri voted to amend their state
constitution to define marriage as a union between a man and a woman.1
While the amendment was passed by a wide margin,2 the months preceding the
vote were ones of lively debate on the issue.3 Organizations like churches and
civil rights groups advanced their stances through television commercials and
billboards. Private individuals also found themselves especially active in the
political discourse surrounding the issue, expressing their views on bumper
stickers, around the water cooler, and at the corner tavern.
About two weeks before the election, when it seemed that the political
debate was at its height, the residents of my neighborhood found, on the
windshield of their cars, small white pamphlets that appeared to have been
printed on a home computer. The fliers urged all to vote against gay marriage
for the sake of protecting their souls on Judgment Day, because, as the flier
argued, “homosexuality is an abominable sin that attaches even to those who
support it.” The small white paper listed several rather extreme rationales for
supporting the amendment, most unmentioned by any large groups that were
advocating through traditional media. The pamphlet was unquestionably
provocative and incited debates and speculations among neighbors. It did not,
however, provide any indication as to the identity of its author or distributor.
Under Missouri law, this mystery pamphleteer’s conduct subjected her to
prosecution for committing a class A misdemeanor—Missouri, along with
nearly every other state, criminalizes this form of anonymity.4 While the
regulations vary in their breadth, these campaign statutes generally require that
1. Matthew Franck, Foes of Gay Marriage Hope Vote is Catalyst, ST. LOUIS POSTDISPATCH, Aug. 5, 2004, at A1. The measure drew more votes than any other issue or race on
the ballot. Id.
2. The constitutional amendment defining marriage as “only between a man and a woman”
passed with seventy-one percent support. Id.
3. Matthew Franck, Friends and Foes Mobilize on Gay Marriage Measure, ST. LOUIS
POST-DISPATCH, July 26, 2004, at A9 (describing the large-scale grass-roots efforts by local
groups supporting and opposing the amendment).
4. In 1995, forty-nine states had passed statutes like those described infra. McIntyre v.
Ohio Election Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 377 n.2 (1995) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
925
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an author or sponsor disclose his or her identity on political literature
pertaining to elections or ballot initiatives.5 However, several of these statutes
have also been declared unenforceable as unconstitutional encroachments on
First Amendment rights.6 So, while the mystery pamphleteer would be
committing a crime, some courts would protect her actions, as she is exercising
one of her most fundamental freedoms under the Bill of Rights.
The First Amendment provides that “Congress shall make no law . . .
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press.”7 The text of the Amendment
is deceptively simple. Justice Hugo Black was fond of the phrase “no law
means no law.”8 Still, Congress has repeatedly regulated free speech, and the
courts, along with Justice Black himself, have found many of those regulations
to be justified.9 On its face, the clause may appear to regulate only spoken and
5. For example, Missouri Revised Statute section 130.031(8) states that
[a]ny person publishing, circulating, or distributing any printed matter relative to any
candidate for public office or any ballot measure shall on the face of the printed matter
identify in a clear and conspicuous manner the person who paid for the printed matter
with the words “Paid for by” followed by the proper identification of the sponsor pursuant
to this section.
MO. REV. STAT. § 130.031(8) (2004). The section goes on to exempt several articles, including
personally created signs displayed at the home and articles and commentaries published in
newspapers and periodicals. Id. It is also a violation of the statute to purposely provide false,
misleading, or incomplete information in complying with the statute. Id. § 130.031(11). Any
person who purposely violates these sections is guilty of a class A misdemeanor, which subjects
her to up to one year of imprisonment. Id. §§ 130.081(1), 558.011(1)(5) (2004). There is also a
federal campaign disclaimer statute. 2 U.S.C. § 441(d) (2000).
6. See ACLU of Nev. v. Heller, 378 F.3d 979 (9th Cir. 2004) (discussed infra note 92).
Other state disclosure statutes have also been declared unconstitutional, but not as First
Amendment violations. For example, in Commonwealth v. Dennis, 329 N.E.2d 706 (Mass.
1975), the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts considered a statute that made it a crime to
write or distribute any circular designed to aid or defeat any candidate or any question submitted
to the votes unless it contained the name of the voter responsible. Id. at 707. The court struck
down the statute on equal protections ground. Id. at 707–10. See Erika King, Comment,
Anonymous Campaign Literature and the First Amendment, 21 N.C. CENT. L.J. 144, 160 n.102
(1995), for a description of similar court decisions.
7. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
8. DANIEL A. FARBER, THE FIRST AMENDMENT 1 (1998). Justice Black was an absolutist
free speech supporter, who regarded the First Amendment as crucial to the survival of democracy.
For the Judge, the “important thing was that the people have an opportunity to hear
all sides of [an issue] and to decide freely what laws they want to live by. . . . It was this
view that led [him] to place such heavy emphasis upon the First Amendment as the basic
law guaranteeing the right of the people to open discussion of public issues.” The
underlying premise of the First Amendment was that, if the people heard all sides of an
issue, however controversial or heretical the ideas might be, they would choose “the
better, wiser, more beneficial of alternative courses.”
HOWARD BALL, HUGO L. BLACK: COLD STEEL WARRIOR 189 (1996) (alterations in original)
(footnotes omitted).
9. FARBER, supra note 8, at 1.
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written expression, but other forms of expression, like symbolic expression,
have fallen within the purview of First Amendment protection.10 The First
Amendment even extends protection to some particular “absences of
expression”—anonymous speech.
The right to anonymous speech is closely tied to the topic of political
expression, where a speaker’s identity can have an exceptional influence on the
message’s recipients.11 As the Supreme Court has recognized, “[a]nonymous
pamphlets, leaflets, brochures and even books have played an important role in
the progress of mankind,”12 and, despite the growing prevalence of consumer
registration procedures and heightened security measures that demand selfidentification, anonymity has remained a meaningful aspect of the day-to-day
life of most ordinary citizens.13
In 1995 the Supreme Court decided the controlling case on anonymous
political speech, McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission.14 In McIntyre the
Supreme Court considered a challenge to an Ohio statute that required any
written communication designed to influence voters in an election to contain
the name and address of the party responsible for paying for or producing the
communication.15 The Court held that the statute was an unconstitutional
abridgement of the right to engage in anonymous political speech.16 The
McIntyre decision left open several issues regarding political speech and
anonymity, and lower courts have struggled over what factual distinctions
might produce a different outcome on the constitutionality of this type of
statute.
This Note examines the link between anonymous speech and political
expression by analyzing two recent federal court of appeals decisions, Majors

10. Id.; see, e.g., Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 414–15 (1974) (holding that a college
student’s display of an American Flag upside down with a peace sign on it was protected
symbolic expression under the First Amendment). The development of the Courts’ jurisprudence
on anonymous speech will be analyzed infra.
11. “[I]n the field of political rhetoric . . . ‘the identity of the speaker is an important
component of many attempts to persuade.’” ACLU of Nev. v. Heller, 378 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir.
2004) (quoting City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43, 56 (1994)).
12. Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60, 64 (1960).
13. See Lee Tien, Who’s Afraid of Anonymous Speech? McIntyre and the Internet, 75 OR. L.
REV. 117, 117 (1996) (“Unless you’re a celebrity, you’re effectively unknown as you schlepp
through the big city. Suicide hotlines, Alcoholics Anonymous, and the secret ballot are
conventional examples of socially legitimate, institutionalized anonymity practices.”). The
everyday experience of anonymity is especially relevant in most law schools, where the practice
of blind grading is meant to ensure, at least in part, that a student’s actual performance on the
exam, and not any improper influence, is the exclusive factor in determining her final score.
14. 514 U.S. 334 (1995).
15. Id. at 338.
16. Id. at 357.
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v. Abell17 and ACLU of Nevada v. Heller.18 Both decide the constitutionality
of state statutes that limit an individual’s or group’s right to engage in
anonymous political speech by requiring those parties to include their identity
on any political advertising materials they produce.19 In Majors, the Seventh
Circuit upheld an Indiana statute requiring political advertising to identify the
people who paid for the advertising.20 Six months later, in Heller, the Ninth
Circuit struck down a similar Nevada statute.21 The Ninth Circuit did make
some attempt to distinguish its ruling from that of Majors,22 but the two
opinions are openly at odds with each other in several ways.23
To lay a foundation for analyzing Majors and Heller, this Note first
describes the significant role of anonymity in the formation and early history
of this country. It then provides a brief overview of the modern Supreme
Court case law on anonymous political speech, with a more thorough
explanation and analysis of McIntyre. This Note next reviews some lower
court decisions on anonymous political speech since McIntyre, which illustrate
some of the questions and problems that McIntyre left unresolved.
The remainder of the Note will focus on the Seventh Circuit’s decision in
Majors and the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Heller. First, it will summarize the
facts and holdings of the cases, as well as the analyses used by the two courts.
The Note will then contrast the courts’ approaches to resolving their similar
cases and will argue that, while the outcomes of the two cases are reconcilable,
the courts’ decisions were driven by contrasting legal and theoretical
presumptions, illustrating two very different approaches to state statutes that
regulate political communications by requiring the messenger to disclose her
identity on the communication. After drawing out the more significant
distinctions between the decisions, this Note concludes by arguing that upon
the Supreme Court’s re-confrontation with the issue, it should follow the Ninth
Circuit’s preferable approach to anonymous political speech.
II. BACKGROUND
A.

History of Anonymous Speech Under the First Amendment

In cases questioning anonymity and the First Amendment, the historical
use of anonymity, especially by the Constitution’s framers, has been

17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

361 F.3d 349 (7th Cir. 2004).
378 F.3d 979 (9th Cir. 2004).
Majors, 361 F.3d at 350; Heller, 378 F.3d at 981.
361 F.3d at 355.
378 F.3d at 1002.
Id. at 1000–02.
See infra notes 174–222 and accompanying text.
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persuasive to and regularly referenced by modern courts.24 The framers’ exact
intent regarding the meaning and importance of the First Amendment is
unclear.25 However, the Supreme Court has interpreted the purpose of the First
Amendment as closely tied to the political process, ensuring a lively
marketplace of ideas: “[It was intended] ‘to secure the widest possible
dissemination of information from diverse and antagonistic sources’ and ‘to
assure unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and
social changes desired by the people.’”26
Judging from the history of the Framers’ own actions when forming the
union, it is likely that their notions of free speech were meant to include
anonymous speech.27 “[T]he early political climate of the United States was
replete with anonymous writings.”28 For example, perhaps the most famous
lone pamphleteer, Thomas Paine, published his Common Sense—known as the
work that first inspired many Americans to consider separating from Great
Britain—under the pseudonym of “An Englishman.”29 Alexander Hamilton,
John Jay, and James Madison originally published the Federalist Papers under

24. See, e.g., McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 343 (1995) (referring to
the “respected tradition of anonymity in the advocacy of political causes”) (footnote omitted);
Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60, 64 (1960) (“Anonymous pamphlets, leaflets, brochures and
even books have played an important role in the progress of mankind. Persecuted groups and
sects from time to time throughout history have been able to criticize oppressive practices and
laws either anonymously or not at all.”); State v. N.D. Educ. Ass’n, 262 N.W.2d 731, 735 (N.D.
1978) (“It is worth remembering that among the glories of our nation’s history are documents
written under pseudonyms by men who were to become the second, third and fourth
Presidents . . . the first Chief Justice and the first Secretary of the Treasury and Secretary of State
of the United States.”); People v. Duryea, 351 N.Y.S.2d 978, 989 (N.Y. App. Div. 1974)
(“Anonymity has been, historically, the medium of dissidents, shielding them from the retaliatory
power of the establishment and, whether their fears of reprisal were justified or not, encouraging
them to express unpopular views. Anonymous writings have an honored place in our political
heritage.”).
25. The legislative record surrounding the adoption of the First Amendment is unhelpful.
FARBER, supra note 8, at 9–10.
26. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 49 (1976) (citations omitted); see also McIntyre, 514 U.S.
at 346 (“[A] major purpose of [the] Amendment was to protect the free discussion of
governmental affairs.”).
27. For a persuasive argument that history almost certainly proves that the Framers
originally viewed anonymity as a vital part of free speech, see Jonathan Turley, Registering
Publius: The Supreme Court and the Right to Anonymity, CATO SUP. CT. REV. 57, 58–61 (2001–
2002). But see the dissenting opinion of Justice Scalia in McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 371–85. There,
Justice Scalia concluded that historical evidence was inconclusive as to whether anonymous
political speech merited constitutional protection. Id. at 373–76; see also Amy Constantine,
Note, What’s in a Name? McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission: An Examination of the
Protection Afforded to Anonymous Political Speech, 29 CONN. L. REV. 459, 466–67 (1996).
28. Jennifer B. Wieland, Note, Death of Publius: Toward a World Without Anonymous
Speech, 17 J.L. & POL. 589, 591 (2001).
29. Id. at 591–92.
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the joint pseudonym of “Publius.”30 Their opponents in discourse also
published under various pseudonyms.31 Benjamin Franklin regularly wrote
under assumed names.32 This tradition of using anonymity when attempting to
persuade the public continued into the early years of this country.33
However, even the earliest use of anonymity had its controversies. While
the use of anonymity in the country’s formational years is now regarded as
heroic,34 it was met with its fair share of opposition at the time.35 For example,
“[t]he Continental Congress tried to uncover the identity of the writer known
as ‘Leonidas’ after he accused Congress of corruption and ineptitude.”36 In
New Jersey, early legislators sought out the identity of “Cincinnatus” to charge
him with sedition.37 The printer of “Cincinnatus” would not reveal the
author’s identity, declaring: “Were I to comply . . . I conceive I should betray
the trust reposed in me, and be far from acting as a faithful guardian of the
Liberty of the Press.”38
B.

Modern Supreme Court Decisions on Anonymous Political Speech

Despite attacks, the tool of anonymity has continued to be a regular choice
of those wishing to express their opinions and persuade others.39 Despite the
continuous use of anonymity, it was more than 170 years after the first
Federalist Papers were published before the Supreme Court recognized a right
to anonymity. In 1958, the Court tentatively affirmed a right to anonymous
group membership in NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson.40 There, the Court
held that the state could not compel the NAACP to turn over its membership
lists because it would violate the members’ rights to freely associate in
30. Id. at 592.
31. Id.
32. McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 341 n.4 (1995) (citing 2 W. BRUCE,
BENJAMIN FRANKLIN SELF-REVEALED: A BIOGRAPHICAL AND CRITICAL STUDY BASED MAINLY
ON HIS OWN WRITINGS ch. 5 (2d ed. 1923)).
33. “It has been asserted that, between 1789 and 1809, six presidents, fifteen cabinet
members, twenty senators, and thirty-four congressmen published anonymous political writings.”
Wieland, supra note 28, at 592 (citing Comment, The Constitutional Right to Anonymity: Free
Speech, Disclosure and the Devil, 70 YALE L.J. 1084, 1085 (1961)).
34. “Under our Constitution, anonymous pamphleteering is not a pernicious, fraudulent
practice, but an honorable tradition of advocacy and of dissent.” McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 357.
35. See Turley, supra note 27, at 60.
36. Id. (citing Justice Thomas’ concurrence in McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 361–62).
37. Id.
38. Id. (quoting R. HIXON & ISAAC COLLINS, A QUAKER PRINTER IN 18TH CENTURY
AMERICA 95 (1968)).
39. For example, Samuel Clemens (Mark Twain), Mary Ann Evans (George Eliot), and Eric
Blair (George Orwell) are among the many who have chosen, for various reasons, to publish
under pseudonyms. See, e.g., Turley, supra note 27, at 57.
40. 357 U.S. 449, 466 (1958); see also Wieland, supra note 28, at 594–95. The first of the
Federalist Papers was printed in 1787. THE FEDERALIST NO. 1 (Alexander Hamilton).
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privacy.41 In 1960, the Court addressed anonymous speech directly in Talley v.
California,42 discussed below. Since then, the Court has gradually begun to fill
in gaps by defining what guarantees the First Amendment provides with
respect to anonymous speech.
1.

Talley v. California

In Talley v. California, the Court considered the constitutionality of a city
ordinance that forbade any person from distributing any handbill that did not
have printed on it the name of the person who “printed, wrote, compiled or
manufactured the same” and the name of the person who “caused the same to
be distributed.”43 Justice Hugo Black, an unapologetic supporter of free
speech, wrote for the majority.44 The Court held that the statute was
unconstitutional, reasoning that it was an overbroad method of achieving the
state’s purported interests of protecting against fraud, false advertising, and
libel.45 The Court recognized the historical importance of anonymous speech46
and rationalized that the ordinance would greatly hinder freedom of expression
because the “fear of reprisal might deter perfectly peaceful discussions of
public matters of importance.”47
2.

Buckley v. Valeo

In the highly complex Buckley v. Valeo,48 the Court ruled that some rights
to anonymity could be sacrificed for compelling state interests. In Buckley, the
Court confronted various challenges to the Federal Election Campaign Act of
1974.49 The Act, passed after the Watergate scandal, was motivated by
concerns about corruption during the Nixon Administration and a general
belief that the rising costs of campaigns forced politicians to spend more time
fundraising than tending to their official duties.50 One set of provisions
regulated contribution and expenditure limits, a second set imposed disclosure
and reporting requirements, and a third set established a system of public
funding for presidential campaigns.51

41. Patterson, 357 U.S. at 466.
42. 362 U.S. 60 (1960).
43. Id. at 60–61 (quoting LOS ANGELES, CAL., CODE § 28.06 (1960)).
44. Id. at 60.
45. Id. at 63–65.
46. See id. at 64–65, for a lengthy discussion of significant anonymous writings throughout
England and the United States during colonial times.
47. Talley, 362 U.S. at 65.
48. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
49. Id. at 7; Pub. L. No. 93-443, 88 Stat. 1263.
50. See FARBER, supra note 8, at 234.
51. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 10–11.
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The Court’s treatment of the disclosure and reporting requirements was
“an important step in anonymous speech jurisprudence.”52 While the Court
observed that contributing to a campaign is a form of expression and that a
requirement forcing disclosure of contributions might deter some from
contributing if they could not do so anonymously,53 it nevertheless upheld the
disclosure requirements of the statute because the governmental interests were
sufficient to pass the test of “exacting scrutiny.”54
The Buckley decision did recognize expenditures and contributions as
political speech and did allow for certain state abridgement of that political
speech.55 Still, as the Supreme Court would later make clear, it is not this type
of “symbolic expression” that is closest to the heart of the rationale for First
Amendment protection for anonymous speech because “even though money
may ‘talk,’ its speech is less specific, less personal, and less provocative than a
handbill—and as a result, when money supports an unpopular viewpoint it is
less likely to precipitate retaliation.”56
3.

McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission

Almost twenty years after Buckley, the Supreme Court faced a different
type of election regulation, but this time the government’s interests were
insufficient to justify the restrictions on free speech. In the landmark case of
McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission,57 the Court dealt with the issue of
whether an Ohio statute that prohibited the distribution of anonymous
campaign literature abridged the First Amendment right to freedom of
speech.58
a.

Facts and Holding

In 1988, Margaret McIntyre appeared at a public meeting regarding a
McIntyre, acting almost completely
proposed school tax levy.59
independently, distributed leaflets expressing her opposition to the tax levy.60
While some of the leaflets identified McIntyre as the author, others were
merely signed by “CONCERNED PARENTS AND TAXPAYERS.”61 Several

52. Wieland, supra note 28, at 597.
53. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 68.
54. Id. at 60–84.
55. Id. at 64–69.
56. McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 355 (1995).
57. Id. at 334. Justice Stevens delivered the opinion of the Court. Id. at 335. Justices
Ginsburg and Thomas both concurred and filed separate opinions. Id. Justice Scalia filed a
dissenting opinion, which Chief Justice Rehnquist joined. Id.
58. Id. at 336.
59. Id. at 337.
60. Id.
61. McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 337.
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months later, a school official filed a complaint with the Ohio Elections
Commission charging that McIntyre’s distribution of the anonymous leaflets
violated the Ohio statute at issue.62 The Commission imposed a fine of
$100.00.63
The Supreme Court recognized that the actual monetary stakes in the case
were quite low, but granted certiorari regarding the constitutionality of the
statute because of the issue’s great importance.64 Unlike the city statute under
fire in Talley, which prohibited all anonymous hand billing “in any place under
any circumstances,”65 Ohio’s statute applied only “to unsigned documents
designed to influence voters in an election.”66 Despite the Ohio statute’s
narrower scope, the Court decided that the reasoning of Talley supported its
ultimate conclusion that the state’s interests in protecting the electoral
process—specifically, providing the electorate with relevant information and
preventing fraudulent and libelous statements—did not justify the state’s
attempt to limit free speech.67
The Court quickly disposed of Ohio’s purported state interest of fostering
an informed electorate by likening an author’s identity to any other content that
the author may choose to include or exclude.68 “The simple interest in
providing voters with additional relevant information does not justify a state
requirement that a writer make statements or disclosures she would otherwise
omit.”69 Overall, the Court’s rejection of this purported state interest revealed
its stance that the electorate was fully capable of taking into consideration the
anonymity of the message when evaluating the significance of that message.70
b.

Unfinished Business

While the Court made clear that it was extending protection to anonymous
political speech under the First Amendment, and that Ohio’s statute was
certainly not narrowly tailored, it left a great deal unsaid about what might tip
the constitutional scales for similar statutes.
The opinion implies an extensive list of factors that might cause a different
outcome: a statutory exception for “individuals acting independently and using
their own modest resources,” regulatory coverage of exclusively candidate-

62. Id. at 338.
63. Id.
64. See id. at 340–41.
65. Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60, 60 (1960).
66. McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 344.
67. Id. at 348–51, 357. “[P]olitical speech by its nature will sometimes have unpalatable
consequences, and, in general, our society accords greater weight to the value of free speech than
to the dangers of its misuse.” Id. at 357.
68. Id. at 348–49.
69. Id. at 348.
70. Constantine, supra note 27, at 463.
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related speech (and not ballot issues), a stronger temporal relationship between
the election and the release of the message, an exception for speakers who fear
reprisal, “a dollar threshold that would track campaign expenditure laws,”
language tailored to regulate only false or misleading messages, and the “type
of information the speaker must provide.”71 The Court’s shortcomings on
clarity did not go unnoticed by the dissent or scholarly critics.72
C. Early Aftermath of McIntyre
Justice Scalia, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, wrote a highly critical
dissent in McIntyre, attacking several of the majority’s assumptions and
conclusions.73 Near the conclusion of his opinion, Justice Scalia scolded the
majority for the practical problem of failing to announce a clear rule of law and
forecasted an inevitable era of judicial uncertainty regarding anonymous
political speech:
[A]fter having announced that this statute, because it “burdens core political
speech,” requires “‘exacting scrutiny’” and must be “narrowly tailored to serve
an overriding state interest,” (ordinarily the kiss of death), the opinion goes on
to proclaim soothingly (and unhelpfully) that “a State’s enforcement interest
might justify a more limited identification requirement.” . . . Perhaps, then, not
all the state statutes I have alluded to are invalid, but just some of them; or
indeed maybe all of them remain valid in “larger circumstances”! It may take
decades to work out the shape of this newly expanded right-to-speakincognito, even in the elections field.74

71. Id. at 477, 477 nn.104–07.
72. See id. at 477–81; Richard L. Hasen, The Surprisingly Easy Case for Disclosure of
Contributions and Expenditures Funding Sham Issue Advocacy, 3 ELECTION L.J. 251, 252 (2004)
(“Was the right to anonymous speech recognized in McIntyre limited to those persons engaging
in face-to-face communications, leaving laws requiring disclosure in separately-filed reports
constitutionally sound? Did it matter that the McIntyre plaintiff was a lone pamphleteer using
modest personal resources, in which case McIntyre left undisturbed laws requiring disclosure in
‘other, larger circumstances?’ Did the McIntyre right to anonymity extend only to ballot measure
elections and not to candidate elections?”).
73. McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 371–85. Justice Scalia challenged the majority’s conclusion that
because the Framers engaged in anonymous political speech, it is clear that anonymous political
speech was meant to fall within First Amendment protections. Id. at 372–73 (“But to prove that
anonymous electioneering was used frequently is not to establish that it is a constitutional right.”).
Instead, Justice Scalia put forth an ongoing history argument of constitutional interpretation,
citing the forty-nine state statutes very similar to Ohio’s. Id. at 375–77 (“Such a universal and
long-established American legislative practice must be given precedence, I think, over historical
and academic speculation regarding a restriction that assuredly does not go to the heart of free
speech.”).
74. McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 380–81 (citations omitted). Justice Scalia was especially critical
of Justice Ginsburg’s concurring opinion, which stressed that “[i]n for a calf is not always in for a
cow. . . . We do not thereby hold that the State may not in other, larger circumstances require the
speaker to disclose its interest by disclosing its identity.” Id. at 358.
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Nearly one decade has passed, and it appears that Justice Scalia’s forecast is
coming true. Legislatures have struggled with what to make of McIntyre,75 as
have the courts.
For example, in State v. Doe,76 the Texas Court of Appeals held that a
section of the state’s election code, similar to that of Ohio in McIntyre, was an
unconstitutional burden on free speech.77 While the Texas statute would not
apply to individuals acting independently with their own modest resources, the
court did not find this factual difference worthy of distinguishing it from
McIntyre.78 In its analysis, the court found the statute to be a burden on core
political speech,79 subjected it to “exacting scrutiny,”80 and recognized the

75. In his May 5, 1999 testimony before the House Subcommittee on the Constitution of the
Committee on the Judiciary, David M. Mason, Commissioner of the Federal Election
Commission, reviewed several of the lower court decisions applying McIntyre, advising Congress
that it “would be well served to consider carefully how (if at all) to expand disclosure
requirements, rather than simply treating more disclosure as automatically better. The trend in
court decisions indicates that we face at least some risk of having even current disclosure
requirements struck down or narrowed.” First Amendment and Restrictions on Political Speech:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong.
31 (1999) (statement of David M. Mason, Commissioner, Federal Election Commission). For a
discussion of the variance in several state legislative responses to McIntyre’s holding, see
Constantine, supra note 27, at 478–81.
76. 61 S.W.3d 99 (Tex. App. 2001).
77. Id. at 101. Section 255.001 of the Texas Election Code provided that a person may not
enter into an agreement to publish political advertising that does not indicate in the advertising:
(1) that it is political advertising; (2) the full name of either the individual who personally
entered into the contract or agreement with the printer . . . and (3) . . . the address of either
the individual who personally entered into the agreement with the printer or publisher or
the person that individual represents.
TEX. ELEC. CODE ANN. § 255.001 (2003).
78. Doe, 61 S.W.3d at 103.
A person’s decision to [publish a political advertisement alone, without the involvement
of another] severely limits his or her opportunity to engage meaningfully in the
anonymous dissemination of political ideas to any significant portion of the electorate. . . .
At best, the statute prevents all but the most resourceful individuals from engaging in the
publication of political advertising without revealing their identity.
Id.
79. Id. Exactly what type of speech is properly categorized as “core political speech” is a
matter of controversy. Cass Sunstein has argued that speech that lies at the “core” of First
Amendment protection is overtly “political speech”; that is, speech that is “both intended and
received as a contribution to public deliberation about some issue.” CASS R. SUNSTEIN,
DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH 130 (1993). Speech that is not “selfconsciously political” lies outside the core. Id. at 152–54. For a criticism that Sunstein’s
conception of core political speech is far too narrow, see William Marshall, Free Speech and the
“Problem” of Democracy, 89 NW. U. L. REV. 191, 194 (1994).
80. Id. (quoting McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 347 (1995)).
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state’s interest in regulating elections as significant,81 but ultimately held that
the statute was not “narrowly tailored” because each of the state’s interests was
already addressed in other legislation, stating that “[a] state cannot
significantly infringe upon an individual’s freedom of speech simply to obtain
the ancillary benefit of detecting violations of other laws.”82
But, in Seymour v. Elections Enforcement Commission,83 the Connecticut
Supreme Court upheld the state’s disclosure statute, even under the ordinary
“kiss of death” of exacting scrutiny.84 The court conducted the same balancing
of the individual’s right to engage in free speech and the state’s interest in
ensuring fair and honest elections.85 Affording a significant deference to the
state’s interest in regulating elections,86 the court found that all of the state
interests—the “big three” of preventing fraud and corruption, assisting with the
enforcement of other campaign laws, and informing voters—were compelling,
and that the statute was narrowly tailored to meet those interests.87 Grasping
on to some of the factors left open in McIntyre, the Connecticut court found the
statue was permissible because it did not regulate individuals acting
independently88 and because it pertained only to “communication discussing
candidates for election or the solicitation of funds for political parties.”89
III. 2004 CIRCUIT SPLIT
A.

Background

Seymour and Doe, discussed above, are only two examples of several
lower court struggles to interpret McIntyre.90 The struggle continued into

81. Id. at 103–04. The state put forth three main interests: the statute deterred and punished
political corruption, served to notify the public of any allegiance a particular candidate might
have with another publisher, and provided a method for detecting expenditures that appeared to
be from individuals but actually came from corporations or Political Action Committees. Id. at
103; see also Wieland, supra note 28, at 611–12.
82. Doe, 61 S.W.3d at 106.
83. 762 A.2d 880 (Conn. 2000).
84. Id. at 884, 892. In his McIntyre dissent, Justice Scalia labeled the exacting scrutiny
standard as “ordinarily the kiss of death.” McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 380.
85. Seymour, 762 A.2d at 885.
86. Id. “Indeed, ‘there must be a substantial regulation of elections if they are to be fair and
honest and if some sort of order, rather than chaos, is to accompany the democratic processes.’”
Id. (quoting Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 730 (1974)).
87. Id. at 885–94.
88. Id. at 891.
89. Id. at 892. For a more extensive discussion of the difference between the regulations of
candidate-related communications and issue-related communications, see discussion infra at
notes 165–68 and accompanying text.
90. Compare Doe v. Mortham, 708 So. 2d 929, 934–35 (Fla. 1998) (interpreting a statute
requiring any independent political advertisement to indicate the name and address of the person
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2004, when Majors v. Abell,91 in the Seventh Circuit, and ACLU of Nevada v.
Heller,92 in the Ninth Circuit, were decided six months apart. These two cases
are clearly not the first decisions to contemplate state statutes that abridge
citizens’ rights to engage in anonymous political speech. Majors and Heller
merit close analysis, however, because they highlight two prevalent postMcIntyre perspectives on anonymous political speech, as well as the major
issues surrounding the topic.
The two courts conducted their analyses in light of a 2003 Supreme Court
decision, McConnell v. Federal Election Commission93 and differed in their
conclusions on its import to the current body of jurisprudence on anonymous
political speech. McConnell considered constitutional challenges to new
disclosure rules in the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA)94 and
will be explained further below.
B.

Facts and Holdings of the Cases
1.

Majors v. Abell

A group of candidates and individuals brought a constitutional challenge to
a provision of the Indiana election laws that required any political advertising
expressly advocating for the election or defeat of a candidate to include

who paid for the advertisement as content-neutral and distinguishing it from McIntyre because the
Florida court interpreted the statute as not applying to lone individuals), and Gable v. Patton, 142
F.3d 940, 944–45 (6th Cir. 1998) (finding a statute requiring all advertisements advocating for a
particular candidate to identify their sponsor, when subjected to strict scrutiny, was narrowly
tailored for governmental interest in preventing corruption and providing state with method of
detecting expenditures that are not truly independent), and Ky. Right to Life, Inc. v. Terry, 108
F.3d 637, 646–48 (6th Cir. 1997) (holding a state statute requiring on-communication
identification disclaimers only for independent expenditures narrowly tailored because it did not
regulate issue advocacy), with Citizens for Responsible Gov’t State Political Action Comm. v.
Davidson, 236 F.3d 1174, 1198–99 (10th Cir. 2000) (recognizing a “constitutionally significant
difference” between on-communication identification and disclosure requirements and striking
down a section of campaign statute requiring donors who make independent expenditures in
excess of $1,000 to include identifying information in any political message produced by the
expenditure because the section was not narrowly tailored to any state interests), and Stewart v.
Taylor, 953 F. Supp. 1047, 1054–55 (S.D. Ind. 1997) (holding that state election campaign statute
which prohibited anonymous electoral campaign literature was not narrowly tailored to meet a
compelling state interest and thus violated candidate’s right to freedom of speech because “[t]he
statute burden[ed] dissemination of campaign literature that [was] informative as well as
misleading”; also arguing that the Court’s “discussion of anonymous political expression
specifically finds its value to campaigns for political office as great if not greater than its value to
referenda”).
91. 361 F.3d 349 (7th Cir. 2004).
92. 378 F.3d 979 (9th Cir. 2004).
93. 540 U.S. 93 (2003).
94. McConnell, 540 U.S. at 93–94; Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81.
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adequate notice of the identity of persons who paid for the advertising.95
Violation of the statute constituted a misdemeanor.96 While the text of the
statute required that a “disclaimer” appear on the political advertising
materials, the Court correctly pointed out that “disclaimer” is a misnomer.97
What the statute actually required would be more appropriately named a
“disclosure”; however, that term “has been appropriated to describe a reporting
requirement,” commonly used when referring to the requirements of campaign
finance laws that mandate the registering of financial amounts spent on
political advertising.98
There was controversy in the state supreme court about the statutory
meaning of “persons” to whom the statute was applicable.99 The state argued
that the statute only applied to candidates and certain party and political action
committees.100 On practical grounds,101 the Indiana Supreme Court held that
the statute applied to “any individual or organization.”102
a.

Majority Opinion

In deciding upon the constitutionality of the Indiana statute, Judge Posner,
writing for the majority, described the Seventh Circuit’s difficult task as
entailing a “balancing of imponderables.”103 In one respect, disallowing
anonymous political advertising might reduce the quantity of political
advertising because some advertisers may be unwilling to reveal their
identities.104 On the other hand, requiring political advertisers to include their
95. Majors, 361 F.3d at 350. The challenge was brought against Indiana Code §3-9-3-2.5,
which is a rather lengthy provision. Majors v. Abell, 792 N.E.2d 22, 24 & n.1 (Ind. 2003). In
summary, the section required that “any ‘person’ must include a ‘disclaimer’ in ‘general public
political advertising’ if the person either ‘solicits a contribution’ or finances ‘communications
expressly advocating the election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate.’” Id. at 24. The
section also included special requirements for different disclosures “depending on whether the
material is authorized and/or financed by a candidate, a candidate’s committee . . . or a party
organization.” Id.
96. IND. CODE ANN. § 3-14-1-3 (2002).
97. Majors, 361 F.3d at 350.
98. Id.
99. Majors, 792 N.E.2d at 24.
100. Id. at 24–25.
101. The court recognized that, in application, it would make very little sense if “persons”
subject to the statute were limited to just candidates or committees:
If a message is such that the candidate would not be willing to be identified with it,
presumably if its authorship leaked the effect of the leak would be to brand the candidate
a sneak as well as a fool. We think the statute is primarily concerned with anonymous
advertising by third parties.
Id. at 29.
102. Id. at 30.
103. Majors v. Abell, 361 F.3d 349, 352 (7th Cir. 2004).
104. Id.
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names on their materials, the court reasoned, would increase the quality of the
political advertising because the additional information will be useful to
voters.105
At the outset, the court distinguished the Indiana statute from the Ohio
statute invalidated in McIntyre.106 While the Ohio statute’s identification
requirements applied to issue ads, the Indiana statute applied only to candidate
ads.107
The court next considered what impact, if any, the Supreme Court’s ruling
in McConnell v. Federal Election Commission might have on McIntyre’s rule
that the government may not forbid the distribution of anonymous campaign
literature.108 The Majors court likened the Indiana statute to the BCRA
regulation of “electioneering communications.”109 In McConnell, the Supreme
Court upheld the BCRA’s requirement that individuals who spend more than
$10,000 producing electioneering communications or contribute at least $1,000
to an organization that produces them must report their identities to the Federal
Election Commission.110 Following the reasoning of Buckley v. Valeo, the
Supreme Court upheld the reporting requirement because it served the state
interests of providing the electorate with information, deterring actual
corruption or the appearance of corruption, and gathering the data necessary to
enforce some of the substantive electioneering restrictions.111
The court likened the Indiana statute to the regulation of electioneering
communication in the BCRA because both provided identity information to the
public.112 Compared with a reporting requirement, an on-communication
identification requirement like Indiana’s had the same effect of destroying
anonymity, making would-be advertisers more susceptible to retaliation,
should they garner unpopular viewpoints. But, as the Majors court recognized,
“having to identify [oneself] to the entire audience for the ad has as a practical

105. Id.
106. Id. at 351.
107. Id. The significance of this distinction lies in the state’s justified interest in the
regulation. “In candidate elections, [the state] can identify a compelling state interest in avoiding
the corruption that might result from campaign expenditures.” McIntyre v. Ohio Elections
Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 356 (1995). While corruption concerns are arguably a compelling state
interest in candidate elections, they are not significant in the context of an issue referendum. First
Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 790 (1978). Still, the public interest in knowing
the source of a message is likely as great in one case as in the other. See infra discussion in text
accompanying notes 207–08.
108. Majors, 361 F.3d at 352–54.
109. Id. at 352–53. The act defines electioneering communications as advertisements
broadcast within 60 days of a general election or 30 days of a primary that refer to a candidate for
federal office. 2 U.S.C. § 434(f)(3)(A)(i) (2004).
110. McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93, 194–96 (2003).
111. Id.
112. Majors, 361 F.3d at 353.
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matter a greater inhibiting effect than just a reporting requirement does because
it broadcasts the advertiser’s name to the entire electoral community.”113 In
turn, the Court also acknowledged that the state interest of informing the public
was less served by a reporting requirement than by an on-communication
identification requirement because fewer people are likely to see a report
registered with the FEC.114
The court also considered the argument that McConnell regarded campaign
financing (rather than those who paid for political ads themselves), and was
therefore inapplicable to the analysis of the Indiana statute.115 The court
rejected this argument, however, heavily persuaded that both types of laws
were intended to serve the same state interest of informing the public.116 The
court admitted its reluctance to disturb the state’s judgment without stronger
guidance from the Supreme Court, and concluded that despite the differences
between the BCRA and the Indiana disclaimer statute, the Supreme Court’s
holding in McConnell sanctioned the Indiana statute’s infringement on the
right to anonymous speech.117
b.

Dubitante Opinion

Judge Easterbrook filed a dubitante opinion118 to express his uncertainty
with several of the majority’s assertions, especially its interpretation of
McConnell’s implications on McIntyre.119 Easterbrook was similarly frustrated
with a lack of a clear standard from the Supreme Court.120 But, unlike the
majority, Easterbrook is highly suspicious that McConnell actually provided
any controlling authority on this particular set of facts.
First, Easterbrook noted that Indiana’s statute was markedly different from
the federal BCRA statute in McConnell. The Indiana statute “start[ed] from a
lower threshold,” by affecting those producing as little as 101 sheets of paper,
and required immediate self-identification to the public, rather than reporting
to an agency.121 Second, Easterbrook questioned whether McConnell could
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 354.
116. Id.
117. Majors, 361 F.3d at 355. “Reluctant, without clearer guidance from the Court, to
interfere with state experimentation in the baffling and conflicted field of campaign finance law
without guidance from authoritative precedent, we hold that the Indiana statute is constitutional.”
Id.
118. Literally, “dubitante” means doubting. A writing judge will usually label his opinion as
dubitante if he or she doubted a legal point, but not the extent to be willing to state that it was
wrong. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 537 (8th ed. 2004).
119. Majors, 361 F.3d at 356–58 (Easterbrook, J. dubitante).
120. Id. at 356.
121. Id. Later in the opinion, Easterbrook stressed that the importance of the BCRA’s
regulations was greater, as they imposed requirements on major expenditures for nationwide
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rightly be said to bear on McIntyre, when McConnell did not discuss the
McIntyre case or even mention any of the other leading cases on anonymous
political speech.122
Third, in Easterbrook’s interpretation of McConnell, the Supreme Court’s
decision to uphold the disclosure requirements of the BCRA was highly
dependent on the statute’s “fidelity” to the imperatives of curtailing public
corruption while allowing room for expression.123 But, Indiana’s statute did
not seem to display a similar level of “fidelity” to these imperatives, and failed
to attach any “weight to the risks borne by supporters of unpopular
candidates.”124
While the majority’s opinion in Majors implies that potential voters are
best served by knowing the source behind their communication, the dubitante
opinion sponsors the opposite perspective on forced disclosure—that the public
may ultimately be better served by an anonymous message:
Anyway, we must consider the possibility that anonymity promotes a focus on
the strength of the argument rather than the identity of the speaker; this is a
reason why Madison, Hamilton, and Jay chose to publish The Federalist
anonymously. Instead of having to persuade New Yorkers that his roots in
Virginia should be overlooked, Madison could present the arguments and let
the reader evaluate them on merit.125

Further, people who may choose to publish anonymously—perhaps for fear of
retaliation or desire to protect their privacy—realize that the consumers of the
message “discount” it because they do not know the source.126 To
Easterbrook, it is possible to allow a greater right to anonymous speech
without imposing serious burdens on those evaluating the message.
2.

ACLU of Nevada v. Heller

The challenged Nevada statute required any person responsible for paying
for the publication of any material or information relating to an election,
candidate, or any question on a ballot to identify her name and address on any
published printed or written matter or any photograph.127 The American Civil

elections, while Indiana’s statute placed great burdens in the much less significant setting. Id. at
358.
122. Id. at 357.
123. Id.
124. Majors, 361 F.3d at 357.
125. Id.
126. Id. This perception contributed to the McIntyre rule. 514 U.S. 334, 348 n.11 (1995)
(“People are intelligent enough to evaluate the source of an anonymous writing. They can see it
is anonymous. They know it is anonymous. They can evaluate its anonymity along with its
message, as long as they are permitted, as they must be, to read that message.”).
127. NEV. REV. STAT. § 294A.320(1)(a) (2003). The statute imposed different requirements
for advertising by the candidates themselves.
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Liberties Union (ACLU) and its executive director brought a First Amendment
facial overbreadth challenge to the statute.128 The district court granted
summary judgment in favor of the defendants, finding that the state’s interests
of promoting truthfulness in campaign advertising, increasing the wealth of
information available to the electorate, and preserving the integrity of the
election process by preventing actual and perceived corruption were
sufficiently compelling.129
Before analyzing the ACLU’s First Amendment concerns, the Ninth
Circuit considered the state’s argument for a narrowing construction,
construing the statute to apply only to “express advocacy,” that is, to
communications expressly advocating for or against a particular outcome in a
candidate election or ballot measure referenda.130 At first, the court stated that
a narrowing construction would have little import in light of McConnell,
because that case, at least as interpreted by the Ninth Circuit, clarified that “the
line between ‘express’ and all other election-related speech is not
constitutionally material.”131 Nevertheless, the court entertained Nevada’s
narrowing construction arguments, but concluded that even if the distinction
were still relevant after McConnell, the language of the Nevada statute was not
fairly susceptible to the state’s proposed limitation.132
As a starting point to its First Amendment analysis, the court made clear
that Nevada’s statue involved the direct regulation of content of political
speech, thus meriting strict scrutiny analysis.133 The court stated that the
McIntyre decision would control the determination of this case, noting the
many similarities between the Nevada statute and the Ohio statute in
McIntyre.134 As in McIntyre, the state legislature had made a “serious, direct
intrusion on First Amendment values.”135 As part of its rationale, the court

128. ACLU of Nev. v. Heller, 378 F.3d 979, 983 (9th Cir. 2004).
129. Id.
130. Id. at 985–87.
131. Id. at 985 (citing McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93, 193–94 (2003)
(rejecting “the notion that the First Amendment requires Congress to treat so-called issue
advocacy differently from express advocacy”)). In 1987 the Ninth Circuit defined “express
advocacy” as “that speech which is directed to influence a particular outcome of an election, as
opposed to issue advocacy that focuses on the merits of a particular issue without regard for an
election outcome.” Id. (citing Fed. Election Comm’n v. Furgatch, 807 F.2d 857, 864 (9th Cir.
1987)).
132. Id. at 987.
133. Heller, 378 F.3d at 987–88. “The most exacting scrutiny test is applied to regulations
that suppress, disadvantage, or impose different burdens upon speech on the basis of its content,
and to laws that compel speakers to utter or distribute speech bearing a particular message.” 16A
AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 460 (1998). Under exacting scrutiny, a statute will be upheld
only if it serves an overriding state interest and is narrowly tailored to serve that state interest. Id.
134. Id. at 987–89.
135. Id. at 988.
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highlighted several of the arguments for anonymity: it protects an advocate
from retaliation, protects her privacy, and allows her to express her arguments
without the potentially distracting mark of her identity.136
The court next considered the state’s purported compelling interests in
making such a direct intrusion on First Amendment values. The state’s
primary argument was that its statute was distinguishable from the one the
Supreme Court found unconstitutional in McIntyre because Nevada’s statute
contained an exception for a natural person acting without cooperation of any
business or social organization.137 The Ninth Circuit acknowledged that
McIntyre was especially sympathetic to the individual, but was unconvinced
that excluding a lone actor from the statute’s coverage would save it from
constitutional peril.138 Because of the wording of various provisions of the
statute, the exception was actually quite narrow,139 and none of the rationales
for protecting an individual anonymous speaker are less pertinent to an
anonymous business or organization.140
In the alternative, Nevada argued that its interests were more compelling
than those advanced by Ohio in McIntyre and that the post-McIntyre case law
demanded the upholding of the statute.141 Each of Nevada’s three proffered
state interests was unequivocally rejected by the Ninth Circuit.
The state first argued that the statute was justified because of the state’s
interest in fostering an informed electorate.142 The court quickly pointed out
that this exact state interest was found insufficient in McIntyre143 and Nevada
had set forth no persuasive factual distinction between its statute and the one at
136. Id.
137. Id. at 989; see NEV. REV. STAT. § 294A.320(2)(c) (2003).
138. Heller, 378 F.3d at 989.
139. For example, the exception applied to only “a natural person who acts independently,” so
even two individuals, working together but uninvolved with any organization, would be required
to disclose their identities under the statute. § 294A.320(2)(c) (emphasis added); see also Heller,
378 F.3d at 989.
140. A group is just as likely as an individual to believe its ideas are more persuasive without
their identification immediately attached to them. Heller, 378 F.3d. at 989–90. Also, “[l]ike
other choice-of-word and format decisions, the presence or absence of information identifying the
speaker is no less a content choice for a group or an individual cooperating with a group than it is
for an individual speaking alone.” Id. at 990.
141. Id. at 991.
142. Id. at 993. This purported state interest is labeled by many as the “voter competence
rationale.” See Elizabeth Garrett & Daniel A. Smith, Veiled Political Actors: The Real Threat to
Campaign Disclosure Statutes 3 (June 2004) (Univ. Southern Cal. Public Policy Research Paper
No. 03-13), http://ssrn.com/abstract=424603 (arguing that improving competence is among the
most persuasive rationales for requiring campaign disclosures). “Disclosure laws can . . . make
relevant and credible information available to voters—or to informational entrepreneurs like the
media and challengers in elections who act as intermediaries—at a time it can be helpful in the
voting decision.” Id. at 8.
143. Heller, 378 F.3d at 993.
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issue in that case.144 The court opined that the actual effect of Nevada’s statute
could just as likely have been a “worse-informed, not a better-informed”
electorate because if anonymous speech were banned, then some valuable
viewpoints may go entirely unpresented.145 Further, the court made the
practical point that adding the name and address of the organization to the
communication—the requirements for compliance with the Nevada statute—
will in many cases not provide truly useful information.146
The court did recognize that the informational rationale has been found
legitimate by the Supreme Court in ruling on campaign regulations that require
off-communication reporting of expenditures made to finance those
communications, like the regulations at issue in Buckley v. Valeo and
These rulings were easily distinguished because offMcConnell.147
communication reporting does not involve the direct regulation of a
communication’s content.148 The Ninth Circuit reasoned that the Supreme
Court’s upholding of the off-communication reporting statutes, which are less
intrusive on free speech rights, established that an on-communication
identification was inappropriate in this setting.149
The state’s second justification for the statute was its interest in preventing
fraud.150 The court rejected this argument because the statute was overly broad
to serve this interest in that it regulated both true and false speech the same.151
The statute was also ill-fitted to prevent fraud because it contained an
exception for communication by candidates and political parties.152 In the
court’s view, there was no reason for the state to think that candidates or
political committees would be less likely to engage in fraud; “if anything, one
would expect the opposite to be the case.”153
The state’s final argument for the statute’s legitimacy was that the statute
directly advanced “the state’s ability to investigate and enforce other campaign
finance laws that are, in fact, constitutional.”154 The court found the selfidentification requirement to be a poor fit with Nevada’s campaign finance
laws, because the statute did not require any statement of how much money
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 994.
147. Id. at 994–95.
148. Heller, 378 F.3d at 994.
149. Id. at 994–95. To the Heller court, the availability of the alternative requirement was
very persuasive. The Court reasoned that with off-communication reporting regulations, the
imposition on First Amendment rights is less onerous and the fit between the regulations and the
interests they serve is superior. Id. at 994.
150. Id. at 995.
151. Id. at 995–97.
152. Id. at 996–97.
153. Heller, 378 F.3d at 996–97.
154. Id. at 997.
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was contributed to make the publication.155 Once again, the Nevada statute
failed to survive the narrow tailoring requirement of strict scrutiny analysis, as
the statute reached a substantial quantity of speech not subject to the reporting
and disclosure requirements it purportedly helped to enforce.156
C. Analysis
1.

Are Majors and Heller Reconcilable?

Ultimately, the Ninth Circuit held that Nevada’s statute was not well
tailored to meet any of the State’s proffered interests.157 Still, the Ninth Circuit
did not foreclose the possibility that an on-publication identification
requirement could survive constitutional muster.158 Is it possible that these two
circuit court decisions are actually in harmony—or at least not in discord—
with one another?
As a starting point, it is important to recognize that the Nevada statute was
significantly more broad than the Indiana statute. Indiana’s statute only
regulated communications related to candidate elections, and further, only
those election communications that “expressly advocate” for the election or
defeat of a clearly identified candidate.159 The statute required that the persons
who paid for the communication disclose their identities on the face of the
communication.160
Likewise, the Nevada statute required the disclosure of the person or
persons paying for the communication, but also required that their addresses be
included.161 In addition, the Nevada statute regulated many more types of
communications, placing requirements on “any material or information
relating to an election.”162 As the Ninth Circuit noted, the broad language of
this statute “reache[d] objective publications that concern any aspect of an
election . . . for example, discussions of election procedures, analyses of

155. Id. at 998.
156. Id. at 999.
157. Id. at 1000.
158. Heller, 378 F.3d at 1000.
Our conclusion that the Nevada statute at issue here is not narrowly tailored to assist the
state in enforcing other campaign finance laws should not in any way suggest that an onpublication identification requirement could never be narrowly tailored to achieve this
goal. As we have developed, Nevada’s statute is particularly ill-designed for this purpose.
Id.
159. IND. CODE § 3-9-3-2.5(b)(1) (2002).
160. Id. at § 3-9-3-2.5(d).
161. NEV. REV. STAT. § 294A.320(1)(a) (2003).
162. Id. As explained above in notes 130–31 and the accompanying text, the “express
advocacy” difference between the Indiana and Nevada statutes is likely insignificant in light of
McConnell.
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polling results, and nonpartisan get-out-the vote drives . . . .”163 The Nevada
statute also regulated speech relating to both candidates and ballot issues,
where Indiana’s statute was limited to candidate-related communications.164
It is this final distinction, between candidate and issue advocacy, that has
been a constitutionally significant dividing point for courts deciding on the
validity of identity disclosure statutes.165 The chief difference between
regulations of candidate-related speech and issue-related speech is the strength
of the state interests behind the regulations. With candidate elections, the state
has an interest in preventing libel and other fraudulent statements.166 These
concerns are significantly diminished with respect to issues on ballot
measures.167 With candidate elections, the state also has an interest in avoiding
the risk and appearance of corruption.168
While these state interests have been given legitimacy by the courts,
especially in the context of financial reporting requirements like those under
the Federal Election Campaign Act,169 they are far from ironclad with respect
to on-communication disclosure. For one, states are able to prevent
defamation through the enforcement of general fraud and libel statutes as well
as common law torts.170 These laws, coupled with state financial contribution
reporting requirements, are arguably sufficient to serve the state interest
directly, rather than doing so indirectly by “indiscriminately outlawing a
category of speech.”171

163. Heller, 378 F.3d at 986.
164. Id. at 986, 1002.
165. See, e.g., Seymour v. Elections Enforcement Comm’n, 762 A.2d 880, 892 (Conn. 2000).
166. See Sherri L. Eyer, Comment, From Whence it Comes—Is the Message More Revealing
Than the Messenger? McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 115 S. Ct. 1511 (1995), 100 DICK. L.
REV. 1051, 1069 (1996).
167. See Heller, 378 F.3d at 997 (acknowledging that McIntyre did recognize a legitimate
state concern for fraud and libel prevention during election campaigns, but refusing to defer to
that state interest with respect to the Nevada statute because “[i]t covers ballot proposition
elections, in which libel is a remote concern”).
168. In Buckley v. Valeo, the Supreme Court fully endorsed this rationale as justification for
imposing reporting requirements for financial contributions to candidates. 424 U.S. 1, 66–67
(1976). The reporting requirements “deter actual corruption and avoid the appearance of
corruption by exposing large contributions and expenditures to the light of publicity.” Id. at 67.
The exposure might deter candidates and contributors from misusing the funds, and “[a] public
armed with information about a candidate’s most generous supporters is better able to detect any
post-election special favors that may be given in return.” Id.
169. See, e.g., id. at 66–68; Pub. L. No. 93-443, 88 Stat. 1263.
170. For example, in McIntyre, the Court struck down the disclosure statute at issue, at least
in part, because other provisions of Ohio’s statutory and common law prohibited the making or
disseminating of false statements. 514 U.S. 334, 349, 350 n.13 (1995).
171. Id. at 357. Also, in Heller, the Ninth Circuit relied on Riley v. National Federation of
the Blind, 487 U.S. 781 (1988), which struck down a state statute that imposed disclosure
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If one were to accept the differences in candidate and issue
communications, then the two holdings probably can be reconciled. It is on
this distinction that the Ninth Circuit in Heller conceded that the result in its
case is not technically at odds with Majors in the Seventh Circuit.172 However,
the Heller opinion implied that if the Ninth Circuit were to actually evaluate
the Indiana statute, it would not have reached the same conclusion as the
Seventh Circuit. The balancing scale of the Seventh Circuit decision tipped on
the distinction between issue referenda and candidate elections, arguing that
McIntyre’s protections only extended to issue communications.173 While the
Ninth Circuit was willing to accept, arguendo, such a reading of McIntyre, the
court did not appear at all convinced that the distinction is dispositive on the
constitutionality of these types of regulations of campaign speech. In a halfhearted effort to distinguish the Majors decision, the Heller court reasoned that
“[Majors] posited that after McConnell, McIntyre is limited to statutes
precluding anonymous speech regarding ballot questions,” yet “we are not
convinced that McConnell so narrowed McIntyre, [but] if it did, the Nevada
Statute falls on the McIntyre side of the line and, even on [Majors’] analysis, is
invalid.”174
2.

Underlying Disagreements

So yes, the two decisions do not technically “clash” with each other. But
to end the analysis of these opinions here would be unsatisfying, as the two
courts vary in their paths to these conclusions, with these variances
exemplifying much of the ambiguous and unsettled law surrounding
anonymous campaign literature.
a.

Difference Between On-Communication Disclosure of Identity and
Later Reporting of Identity

One of the more glaring differences in the two courts’ approaches is their
opinions on the significance of a statute’s requiring that a political advertiser

requirements designed to prevent corruption among professional fundraisers soliciting on behalf
of charitable organizations. 378 F.3d at 995. In Riley, the Court stated:
In striking down this portion of the Act, we do not suggest that States must sit idly by
and allow their citizens to be defrauded. North Carolina has an antifraud law, and we
presume that law enforcement officers are ready and able to enforce it. Further North
Carolina may constitutionally require fundraisers to disclose certain financial information
to the State . . . . If this is not the most efficient means of preventing fraud, we reaffirm
simply and emphatically that the First Amendment does not permit the State to sacrifice
speech for efficiency.
487 U.S. at 795.
172. See Heller, 378 F.3d at 1002.
173. Majors v. Abell, 361 F.3d 349, 353–54 (7th Cir. 2004).
174. Heller, 378 F.3d at 1002.
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disclose her name on her communication, as opposed to some offcommunication reporting requirement. In Majors, the Seventh Circuit did not
regard this distinction as constitutionally determinative when evaluating past
precedent. The Majors court did claim to take “considerable pause” of the
distinction,175 citing the Supreme Court’s decision in Buckley v. American
Constitutional Law Foundation.176
In Buckley v. ACLF, the Supreme Court invalidated a Colorado law that
required circulators petitioning regarding issue initiatives to wear identification
badges.177 One part of the challenged Colorado regulation required paid
circulators to wear a badge indicating their name, employer, and the
employer’s telephone number.178 Another section of the regulation, which was
not challenged in the case, required each circulator to submit with the petition
and file with the secretary of state’s office an affidavit that included the
circulator’s name and address.179 The Supreme Court struck down the badge
requirement, in part because the affidavit requirement served the state’s
interests while imposing a lesser risk of retaliation or judgment on the
circulators, and imposing a lesser imposition on the individual’s rights.180
Despite Buckley v. ACLF’s implication that a reporting requirement will
sufficiently serve a state’s interests, the Majors court distinguished the
Supreme Court’s reasoning in Buckley v. ACLF because Colorado’s
requirement was “inapplicable to elections of candidates,” the only category of
speech that the Indiana statute covered.181 Majors placed negligible reliance
on Buckley v. ACLF, primarily relying instead on McConnell, a case that
pertained only to reporting requirements.182
The Ninth Circuit in Heller concluded, though, that “it is not just that a
speaker’s identity is revealed, but how and when that identity is revealed, that
matters in a First Amendment analysis of a state’s regulation of political
speech.”183 The court drew a hard line between on-communication selfidentification requirements and later-reporting requirements, labeling this
distinction as “constitutionally determinative.”184 Not only did McIntyre draw
175. Majors, 361 F.3d at 354.
176. 525 U.S. 182 (1999).
177. Id. at 197–200.
178. Id. at 188 n.5.
179. Id. at 188–89 nn.6–8.
180. Id. at 198–200. “While the affidavit reveals the name of the petition circulator and is a
public record, it is tuned to the speaker’s interest as well as the State’s,” while the badge
requirement “operates when reaction to the circulator’s message is immediate and ‘may be the
most intense, emotional, and unreasoned.’ The affidavit, in contrast, does not expose the
circulator to the risk of ‘heat of the moment’ harassment.” Id. (citations omitted).
181. Majors, 361 F.3d at 354.
182. See supra notes 121–22 and accompanying text.
183. ACLU of Nev. v. Heller, 378 F.3d 979, 991 (9th Cir. 2004).
184. Id.
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upon this distinction to set it apart from Buckley v. Valeo,185 but Buckley v.
ACLF also provides considerable support for the argument that the two types
of regulations are in fact very different.186
Further, Heller’s emphasis on this distinction was tied to concern over
privacy interests and the argument that anonymity must be preserved for those
who risk retaliation for their ideas.187 Heller also concluded that a requirement
of on-communication disclosure is a content restriction, while reporting
requirements are not, and that this difference determines the appropriate level
of scrutiny:188
Statutes like the one here at issue . . . must be, and have been, viewed as
serious, content-based, direct proscription of political speech: If certain content
appears on the communication, it may be circulated; if the content is absent,
the communication is illegal and may not be circulated.
As a content-based limitation on core political speech, the Nevada Statute
must receive the most “exacting scrutiny” under the First Amendment.189

As the Ninth Circuit criticized, the Seventh Circuit never made a
meaningful distinction between on-communication disclosure requirements
and reporting requirements. Oddly, while Majors did make some recognition
of a difference between the two types of regulations,190 it did not pay heed to
the distinction, and it allowed McConnell to dictate the outcome of its decision,
despite the fact that the McConnell majority emphasized that disclosure to an
agency did not include the content of the message.191
b.

Legitimacy of the Informational Rationale

In defending legislation that unarguably infringes on free speech rights,
like the Indiana and Nevada statutes, states often justify these regulations with

185. “Though such mandatory reporting undeniably impedes protected First Amendment
activity, the intrusion is a far cry from compelled self-identification on all election-related
writings.” McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 355 (1995).
186. See supra notes 177–80 and accompanying text.
187. See Heller, 378 F.3d at 991–93. For an argument that privacy concerns go largely
unnoticed in analysis of disclosure requirements, especially financial disclosures, see William
McGeveran, Mrs. McIntyre’s Checkbook: Privacy Costs of Political Contribution Disclosure, 6
U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1, 17–20 (2003).
188. Heller, 378 F.3d at 992.
189. Id. The Majors opinion never made clear what level of scrutiny it was applying to the
Indiana statute.
190. See supra notes 181–82.
191. See McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93, 201–02 (2003); see also Majors
v. Abell, 361 F.3d 349, 357 (7th Cir. 2004) (Easterbrook, J., dubitante). Judge Easterbrook could
not commit to what import the distinction carried: “In Indiana the disclosure is affixed to the
speech; the association is unavoidable; does this make a difference? My colleagues think not; I
am not so sure.” Id.
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a state interest in fostering an informed electorate.192 This justification is often
referred to as “the informational rationale,” or the “voter competence
rationale.”193 The legitimacy and proper role of this state interest in a court’s
decision-making process is a matter of some scholarly contention.194 In
Buckley v. Valeo, the informational rationale was one of three primary state
interests that justified the financial disclosure requirements.195 However, in
McIntyre, the Court treated the informational rationale with suspicion, finding
that “[t]he simple interest in providing voters with additional relevant
information does not justify a state requirement that a writer make statements
or disclosures she would otherwise omit . . . Ohio’s informational interest is
plainly insufficient to support the constitutionality of its disclosure
requirement.”196
Despite McIntyre’s seeming rejection of legitimacy of a state’s interest in
voter competence as justifying a statute that requires a political advertiser to
disclose her identity on her communication, the representatives of Indiana and

192. See Raleigh Hannah Levine, The (Un)informed Electorate: Insights into the Supreme
Court’s Electoral Speech Cases, 54 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 225, 227 (2003).
193. Id. at 226 n.2. To some political scientists, voters are “competent” if they cast the same
votes they would have had they possessed all available knowledge about the policy consequences
of their decision. Elisabeth R. Gerber & Arthur Lupia, Voter Competence in Direct Legislation
Elections, in CITIZEN COMPETENCE AND DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS 147, 149 (Stephen L. Elkin
& Karol Edward Soltan eds., 1999). Gerber and Lupia argue that information about campaign
spending can increase voter competence. Id. at 152–59.
194. Compare Levine, supra note 192, at 290–93 (criticizing the Supreme Court’s willingness
to infringe on political speech rights in order to advance the informed voting interest), with
Garrett & Smith, supra note 142, at “Abstract” (arguing for well-formed disclosure statutes that
can improve voter competence in elections because “[v]oters have limited time and attention, so
they should be provided the information most crucial to improving their ability to vote
consistently with their preferences”).
195. 424 U.S. 1, 66–68 (1976).
196. McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 348–49 (1995). It is possible that
the Court was so willing to discount the voter competence rationale in McIntyre because it
believed that the speech in that case was practically of minimal consequence to voters. See
Levine, supra note 192, at 254.
[O]ne plausible way to read to read McIntyre is to say that the McIntyre Court believed
that the anonymity itself was most informative because it signaled the reader to assign
little or no weight to the position stated—opposition to a proposed school tax levy—and
that, because voters would give it little credence, an anonymous campaign leaflet was
unlikely to unduly influence a voter by causing her to vote against her personal
conception of her own best interests and thus differently than she would with different
information. That is, while . . . the Court has often been willing to allow speech
restrictions that it believes will promote informed voting, it saw no reason to restrict
anonymous campaign leaflets. It believed that voters would not pay them much mind
precisely because they were anonymous and therefore that they would not have any
significant effect on voter choice.
Id.
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Nevada both presented it as a compelling state interest that justified the
regulations in Majors and Heller.197 However, the Seventh and Ninth Circuits
weighed this interest differently.
The Seventh Circuit’s opinion in Heller never made explicit its stance on
the merits of the rationale up against the imposition of the on-communication
disclosure requirement of the Indiana statute. Through its analysis of
McConnell’s implications on McIntyre and the immediate facts before it,
though, the Seventh Circuit implied that the state’s interest in informing the
electorate may be even more compelling when justifying on-communication
disclosure requirements than when justifying reporting requirements.
McConnell upheld the portions of the BCRA that required any person who
contributes to the making of an ad to make certain disclosures to the Federal
Election Commission.198 While on-communication disclosures may impose a
greater intrusion on the freedom of political advocacy than later reporting, the
court in Majors was persuaded that on-communication disclosures actually
better fulfill the state’s informational interest, perhaps creating “a wash” in the
balancing of individual rights and state interests: “But of course the very thing
that makes reporting less inhibiting than notice in the ad itself—fewer people
are likely to see the report than the notice—makes reporting a less effective
method of conveying information that by hypothesis the voting public
values.”199
Ultimately, it was in reliance on McConnell that Majors deferred to the
state’s interest of informing its voters in sanctioning the intrusion of the
Indiana statute, all the while recognizing the imperfections of its own
conclusion.200
As an original matter it could be objected that speech and the press would no
longer be free if the government could insist that every speaker and every
writer add to his message information that the government deems useful to the
intended audience for the message, and that it is arbitrary for the government
to single out the identity of the writer or speaker and decree that that
information, though no other that potential voters might value as much or

197. See Brief of State Commissioner Appellees and Supplemental Appendix at 14–19,
Majors v. Abell, 361 F.3d 349 (7th Cir. 2004) (No. 02-2204), 2002 WL 32172589; Defendants–
Appellees’ Dean Heller, Secretary of State, Frankie Sue Del Papa, Attorney General, and State of
Nevada Answering Brief at 27–29, ACLU v. Heller, 378 F.3d 979 (9th Cir. 2004) (No. 0115462), 2001 WL 34098271.
198. McConnell v. Federal Election Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93, 96 (2003).
199. Majors v. Abell, 361 F.3d 349, 353 (7th Cir. 2004). The Ninth Circuit did not buy into
this line of reasoning. “Compared to communication-altering requirements such as the one
imposed by the Nevada Statute, the imposition on freedom of speech of such reporting
requirements is less, while the fit between the regulation and the interest it serves is superior.”
ACLU of Nev. v. Heller, 378 F.3d 979, 994 (9th Cir. 2004) (emphasis added).
200. 361 F.3d at 355.
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more, must be disclosed. But the Supreme Court crossed that Rubicon in
McConnell.201

Much different than in Majors, the Ninth Circuit in Heller directly
confronted Nevada’s purported interest in informing its electorate. Closely
following McIntyre, Heller thoroughly disposed of the informational
rationale.202 Heller not only concluded that Nevada’s informational interest
was not sufficiently strong to support the constitutionality of its disclosure
requirement,203 but it also speculated that, whether justified or not, the statute
simply would not bring about a better-informed electorate.204
Also, rather than assigning any import to the fact that on-communication
disclosure requirements may serve the state informational interest better than
later-reporting requirements, as the Majors opinion implied,205 Heller drew a
much different inference from the Supreme Court’s recognition that reporting
requirements serve the informational interest.
That a later-reporting
requirement would serve the informational interest at all goes to proving that
the on-communication identification requirement is not narrowly tailored:
That reporting and disclosure requirements have been consistently upheld
as comporting with the First Amendment based on the importance of providing
information to the electorate therefore supports rather than detracts from our
conclusion that McIntyre’s rejection of the additional information rationale
remains binding on us. . . . The availability of the less speech-restrictive
reporting and disclosure requirement confirms that a statute like the one here at
issue cannot survive the applicable narrow tailoring standard.206

The Ninth Circuit’s approach to the state interest of informing the
electorate is more persuasive for a variety of reasons. Heller adheres to
McIntyre, which seems completely on point for the issue. In McIntyre, the
Supreme Court made clear that the state’s interest in fostering an informed
electorate does not justify the serious intrusion on First Amendment rights that
would be caused by requiring political advocates to disclose their identities on
their communications.207 Even if the Majors court could distinguish certain

201. Id. It is easy to imagine that the legitimacy of the voter competence rationale may have
been a sticking point among the judges deciding Majors. Judge Easterbrook wrote in his
dubitante opinion that “[a]rguments that speech may be regulated to protect the audience from
misunderstanding should fare poorly and outside of electioneering have faired poorly.” Id. at
357.
202. Heller, 378 F.3d at 993–95.
203. Id. at 993.
204. Id. The thrust of the court’s argument was that if anonymous communications were
banned, especially as much as the broad Nevada statute banned, some useful ideas would go
unsaid, and “[t]he result could be a worse-informed, not a better-informed, electorate.” Id.
205. Majors, 361 F.3d at 351–52; see infra note 208 and accompanying text.
206. Heller, 378 F.3d at 994–95.
207. McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 348 (1995).
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aspects of its analysis of the Indiana statute from McIntyre because of the
differences between issue and candidate speech, the validity of the state
informational interest as justification for on-communication disclosure would
be the same for candidate or issue publications because, as the Majors court
itself recognized, “the public interest in knowing the source of an anonymous
contribution to the debate” is probably as great in one case as in the other.208
McIntyre rejected the informational interest when it came to oncommunication identification requirements.209 Why the Seventh Circuit broke
from McIntyre’s analysis—even after implying that the state interest in
informing the electorate is probably the same for candidate and issue
publications—is not entirely clear.
The Seventh Circuit’s deference to the state’s informational rationale is
unsettling for other reasons. There is an underlying paternalism in the
“informational interest,” because regulations at its hands imply what voters
should and should not be considering in informing themselves, and what might
or might not unduly influence them. The Supreme Court has spoken out
against such paternalistic measures in other contexts, stating that “[t]he very
purpose of the First Amendment is to foreclose public authority from assuming
a guardianship of the public mind through regulating the press, speech, and
religion.”210
Further, it is disconcerting that a court is willing to restrict such a
fundamental right as free speech at the hands of a state’s informational interest,
without any empirical proof that there is any actual increase in voter
competence because of these disclosures.211 Instead, the Majors court only
made reference to a speaker’s identity as being information “that by hypothesis
the voting public values.”212 Yes, the Supreme Court has recognized that a
state has an interest in ensuring fair elections.213 But, when considering a
statute that hinders the exceptional right of free speech with a content
proscription of author identification, it seems that a court should demand more

208. Majors, 361 F.3d at 351–52.
209. McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 348.
210. Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 545 (1945) (Jackson, J., concurring); see also Riley v.
Nat’l Federation of the Blind, 487 U.S. 781, 793 (1988) (“[T]he government, even with the purest
of motives, may not substitute its judgment as to how best to speak for that of speakers and
listeners; free and robust debate cannot thrive if directed by the government.”).
211. For a highly critical review of the Supreme Court’s recognition of the informational
interest, see Levine, supra note 192. Professor Levine cites many criticisms of the Court’s
deference to a state’s informational interest, including the lack of any evidence about voter
confusion. “[T]he Court has allowed these restrictions on the basis of mere speculation and
intuition as to their effects on informed voting, rather than properly requiring empirical
evidence.” Id. at 289.
212. Majors, 361 F.3d at 353 (emphasis added).
213. See supra note 168 and accompanying text.
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evidence before conceding that the state’s interest in informing its electorate is
sufficiently compelling.
c.

Theoretical Differences on Societal Value of Anonymity

Embedded in the two circuits’ approaches in Majors and Hellers are
certain, apparently driving assumptions about anonymity in general, and how
people are or are not served by it.
In Majors, the majority’s assumption seemed to be that people are “better
served” by knowing who is speaking—that this is information that people
desire in order to evaluate the message. The court cited the “avidity with
which candidates for public office seek endorsements” as proof that “the
identity of a candidate’s supporters—and opponents—is information that the
voting public values highly.”214 Disclosure is favored because it produces
more information, and society is better able to judge an idea the more
information it has.215
In contrast, the Heller opinion approached the problem with an
understanding that people may actually be better served by anonymity.
Immediate author identification may effect a disservice to a message’s
recipient: “[F]ar from enhancing the reader’s evaluation of a message,
identifying the publisher can interfere with that evaluation by requiring the
introduction of potentially extraneous information at the very time the reader
encounters the substance of the message.”216 The requirement of disclosure
may deter communication, especially from the margins, where the risk of
social judgment and retaliation may be at the greatest.217 Anonymity may not
only produce better information, as explained above, but it may also produce
more information.218
There may be no real resolution to this debate.219 Both approaches
ultimately rest on the rationale that a democracy thrives if people have a
meaningful, informed choice to exercise.220 The fact remains, though, that
even if political advocates are able to publish their ideas anonymously, it does
not mean that they all will. Anonymity is just as much a part of a message as a
statement of its author’s identity, and people can and will recognize that.221

214. Majors, 361 F.3d at 352.
215. A speaker’s identity is “additional information useful to the consumer.” Id. “[T]o
require only the reporting of the advertiser’s name to a public agency . . . would . . . reduce the
amount of information possessed by voters.” Id. at 355.
216. ACLU of Nev. v. Heller, 378 F.3d 979, 994 (9th Cir. 2004).
217. Id. at 988.
218. See id.
219. See Wieland, supra note 28, at 627 (“The problem is that both arguments—that
anonymity tends to promote truth, and that disclosure tends to promote truth—are correct.”).
220. See id.
221. See McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 348 n.11 (1995).
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People can evaluate anonymity along with the message and discount that
message to whatever degree they deem appropriate. If the First Amendment is
truly meant to foster a “marketplace of ideas” and “the best test of truth is the
power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market,”222
then the best approach affords greater protection for anonymous political
speech and allows citizens to make the choice about whether anonymity will
sink or swim in the marketplace of ideas.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court should again confront the problem of anonymous
political speech and state regulations that require political advocates to include
their identities on their publications. Until it does, lower courts are almost
certain to take widely varying approaches to evaluating constitutionality of
these statutes, such as those taken by the Seventh and Ninth Circuits in their
Majors and Heller decisions. As Majors and Heller prove, even after the
Supreme Court’s 2003 ruling in McConnell, it is remains unclear what
variances in a statute requiring on-communication identification might make it
sufficiently narrowly tailored under McIntyre.
Perhaps there is a
constitutionally determinative distinction between candidate speech and issue
speech, a distinction that keeps the technical holdings of Majors and Heller
from being a true Circuit split. But, the soundness of this distinction is far
from certain. As Judge Easterbrook lamented in Majors, “How can legislators
or the judges of other courts determine what is apt to tip the balance?”223
After all, the Seventh and Ninth Circuit analyses differed on the
significance of requiring someone to attach his identity to his communication,
as opposed to reporting his identity to an agency. The courts also afforded
much different weight to the state’s interest in informing the electorate, and
were steered by different value judgments on the goods and evils of anonymity
in political speech.
When the Supreme Court again confronts the issue, it should heed the
approach of the Ninth Circuit in making clear that the intrusion of requiring a
speaker to attach his identity to his publication is much more significant than
financial reporting, and demands a much stronger state interest—or at least
some showing that reporting requirements are an inadequate means of
informing the electorate—in order to uphold an on-communication
identification requirement.
Of course anonymity has not always been used for noble purposes. It is
impossible to know why my neighborhood’s mystery pamphleteer did not
attach her name to her viewpoints on the Missouri constitutional amendment.
Perhaps she knew that her opinions were controversial, and she did not want to
222. Id.
223. Majors v. Abell, 361 F.3d 349, 357 (7th Cir. 2004) (Easterbrook, J. dubitante).
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subject herself to the harassment of her neighbors. Most probably did not
agree with the pamphleteer’s specific viewpoints. Some were probably deeply
offended by them. But, it is this very type of challenge to the mainstream for
which the right to anonymity should be safeguarded. The expression of even
outrageous views can be productive—even if all of the neighbors emphatically
disagreed with the pamphlet’s position, it likely at least encouraged them to
process their own views, maybe changing those views or solidifying them
along the way. Or, perhaps the neighbors chose to discount the pamphlet
completely because they did not know where it came from. But, at least there
was an opportunity to consider it. It is this opportunity that is central to the
marketplace of ideas concept of the First Amendment and crucial to the
survival of a healthy democracy.
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